




EUI W orking Paper E C O  N o. 95/41
Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing

























































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 95/41
Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing
Giovanni Nero
WP 3 3 0  
EUR




























































































No part o f  this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission o f the author.
©  Giovanni Nero 
Printed in Italy in December 1995 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing
Giovanni Nero * 
European University Institute 
1-50016 Florence, Italy 
nero@datacomm.iue.it 
and
Université de Genève 
CH-1211 Geneve 4, Switzerland
November 1995
Abstract
This paper studies the theoretical implications of location pat­
terns in a spatial multiproduct duopoly model. It addresses the 
following question: To what extent do location patterns affect 
firms’ pricing behaviour and market performance? I show that 
equilibrium prices are higher under a neighbouring location pat­
tern. In other words, noncooperative Nash prices are higher when 
the organisational market structure is such that firms own stra­
tegically dependent outlets. In contrast, I demonstrate that an 
interlaced location pattern yields the most competitive Nash pri­
ces and the highest social welfare. Finally, I also show that from 
a social welfare point of view it is preferable to have three outlets 
rather than two.(JEL D43.L13)
Key Words: Spatial Model, Multiproduct Duopoly, Price Com ­
petition.






















































































































































































The aim of this paper is to study the theoretical implications of location 
patterns in a spatial multiproduct duopoly model. Its goal is to address 
the following question: To what extent does a particular location pat­
tern affect market power and social welfare in a spatial multiproduct 
duopoly? This question is addressed within the traditional framework 
developed by Hotelling’s [1929] paper on spatial competition. The recent 
paper by Bensaid & de Palma [1994], first shows that different organi­
sational structures may theoretically arise: A neighbouring location, an 
interlaced location and a mixed location pattern. In this work I show 
that a neighbouring location pattern yields less competitive prices both 
in the two-outlet and three-outlet cases. I demonstrate that for the two- 
outlet case, social welfare is not affected by location patterns while in 
the three-outlet case, social welfare is unambiguously higher under inter­
laced locations. I also show that from a social welfare point of view it 
is preferable to have three outlets (rather than two). In a related paper 
(Nero [1995a]) I show how these theoretical results can be tested using 
data on intra-European duopoly airline markets. The empirical results 
support the theoretical model since I find that fares are, ceteris paribus, 
higher on intra-European markets which exhibit a neighbouring location 
pattern in the time domain.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the spatial mul­
tiproduct duopoly setting. It is assumed that locations are given and 
that consumers buy exactly one unit of the product (or service). The 
results of price competition are derived in Section 3 and Section 4, for 





























































































2 Price Competition and Location Choice 
in Multiproduct Duopoly
This section provides the general framework for the analysis of spatial 
multiproduct duopoly. The notation and terminology borrow heavily 
from Bensaid & de Palma’s [1994]. Firms and consumers are located on 
a circle with unit circumference (L =  1). In a nonspatial context, the 
length of the circle could be, e.g., 18 hours (from 6 am to 12 pm). Two 
firms, Firm A and Firm B , operate in the market, and entry by ano­
ther potential firm is ruled out. Each multiproduct duopolist provides 
n (n >  2) outlets distributed on the circle with outlet locations denoted 
by Xk (k =  1 ,.., 2n) with 0 <  x\ <  ... <  Xk <  ... <  X2n <  1. Firm 
,4's (Firm B ’s) marginal production cost are assumed to be constant and 
equal to Ca (cb). The fixed cost per outlet and the sunk cost per firm 
are assumed to be zero. Duopolists set mill prices1 pk {k =  l ,.. ,2 n )  
such that profits are maximised under noncooperative Nash behaviour. 
Products or services offered by the duopolists are homogenous except for 
the spatial dimension. In a nonspatial context, one can think of services 
differentiated in the time dimension. It is assumed that consumers are 
uniformly distributed around the circle and the population has mass D. 
They are identical apart from their location. Each consumer buys ex­
actly one unit of the product (or service) so that total market demand 
is inelastic. It is assumed that consumers’ reservation prices are suffi­
ciently large so that consumers always buy the product. Each customer 
patronises the outlet for which the delivered price is the lowest. The 
delivered price is the sum of the mill price plus the utility loss incurred 
by not purchasing at the most preferred outlet. In a purely spatial con­
text, the delivered price represents the sum of the f.o.b. mill price and 
the transportation costs incurred by the customer. It is assumed that 
the indirect utility function of a consumer located at x and purchasing 
good k is Vk =  y — Pk — &(xk ~ z )2, where y represents the income of 
the consumer and 6 >  0 is the utility loss (transportation) rate. In other 
words, the farther a customer is located from its ideal outlet the larger




























































































the delivered price and utility loss. Clearly, each customer patronises the 
outlet where he obtains the maximal utility.
Let us assume that X2n+i — x\ and that Xk < Xk+i . The consumer 
who is indifferent between outlet k and k +  1 has a location Zk such that:
y  - P k -  f>(z k -  x k f  =  y  -  P k + i  -  b ( z k  ~  X k + 1 ) 2 - ( 1 )
Using (1), the location of the marginal consumer, Zk(-), is equal to
Zk
X k  “b X k + ]  ^  P k + l  P k  
2 26(xk+i -  xk) ’
k — 1 , . . ,2n. ( 2 )
By convention z0 =  Z2„ -  1. Given (2) we can derive the market shares 
Sjt(-) and therefore the demand for each outlet k. Clearly, the market 
shares will be a function of (a) the vector of locations x = (x1,..,x2„) 
and (b) the vector of prices p — (p i,-,P 2n)- The market shares Sk(x,p) 
of outlet k is simply given by the following expression:
Sk{x,p) =  zk -  zk- 1, k =  1 , . . ,2n. (3)
Assume that Firm A owns every outlet k G K A with I\A U K b — 
{ l , . . ,2 n } . Given the assumptions on the fixed and sunk costs, Firm 
A ’s profit is:
n A(x,p) =  D ( Y ,  (P* “  cA)Sk{x ,p )). (4)
kei<A
Similarly, Firm B's profit is:
n b (x ,p ) =  D ( Y 1  (P* -  cB)Sk(x ,p )). (5)
kÇKg
In order to solve the above multiproduct maximisation problem, two 
equilibrium concepts have been investigated in the literature: A simul­
taneous equilibrium where both firms choose product range-locations 
and prices simultaneously (Gabszewicz k. Thisse [1986]) and a two stage 
equilibrium where both firms simultaneously choose product range-locations 
and then prices in a second stage (see e.g., Martinez-Giralt & Neven 




























































































Figure 1: Sym metric Locations in the Three Outlet Case
x\
equilibrium. Past research has shown that neither the simultaneous 
price-location equilibrium nor the two stage equilibrium exist within the 
above duopoly framework. In particular, Martinez-Giralt k  Neven [1988] 
show that in the two stage duopoly model, firms always have an incen­
tive to sell (or produce) a single (maximally differentiated) product at 
equilibrium. This is because, when a firm adds a second product, two 
contrasting effects are at work. On the one hand, the introduction of a 
second product allows the firm to increase its market share (market seg­
mentation). On the other hand, it increases price competition. Martinez- 
Giralt k  Neven [1988] show that the negative price effect outweighs the 
positive market share effect. Nero [1995b] recently shows that when 
duopolists face a ‘binding’ reservation price, i.e., when consumers have 
an elastic (downward sloping) demand and a finite and small reservation 
price, a multiproduct equilibrium may emerge as the result of a two stage 
game. This is because, contrary to the Martinez-Giralt k  Neven’s [1988] 
result, the price effect turns out to be positive: The introduction of a 
second product allows duopolists to charge a higher mill price. Using 
a framework similar to Martinez-Giralt k  Neven [1988], Bensaid k  de 
Palma [1994] demonstrate that as soon as three or more firms compete in 
the market, multiproduct equilibria emerge. This occurs because a single 
product firm always has an incentive to introduce a second product when 
it faces two or more competing firms.
When duopolists are assumed to provide more than one outlet, several 
location patterns may theoretically arise. Using Bensaid & de Palma’s 
[1994] terminology, I define the following three different types of location 
equilibria: An interlaced outlet equilibrium, a neighbouring outlet 
equilibrium and a mixed outlet equilibrium. For example, let us assume 




























































































ced outlet equilibrium occurs when outlets’ identity (ownership) alterna­
tes. This arises when Firm A owns every outlet k £ K A =  {1 ,3 ,5 }  and 
Firm B owns every outlet k £ Kg — {2 ,4 ,6 } . In this type of location 
it is as if each firm wishes to offer a ‘product line’ as broad as possi­
ble. A neighbouring outlet pattern characterises an equilibrium with all 
the outlets owned by a firm located next to each other. Then Firm A 
owns every outlet k £  K A — {1 ,2 ,3 }  and Firm B owns every outlet 
k £ K b =  {4 ,5 ,6 } . Here each firm wishes to specialise on a segment of 
the ‘product line’ . Finally, a mixed outlet pattern combines the interla­
ced and neighbouring equilibria. A mixed outlet equilibrium may occur, 
e.g, when Firm A owns every outlet k £ I\ ,\ =  {1 ,2 ,5 }  and Firm B owns 
every outlet k £  Kg  =  {3 ,4 ,6 } .
In conclusion, when one departs from the Hotelling’s [1929] original as­
sumptions, multiproduct equilibria are likely to emerge in models of spa­
tial competition. Besides oligopolistic competition (see Bensaid Sz de 
Palma [1994]) and elasticity of the demand (see Nero [1995b]), additional 
features such as capacity constraints or economies of scope may provide 
more insight into spatial multiproduct competition. Unfortunately, as 
stressed by Greenhut et al.[1987], ‘one of the major problems in the ana­
lysis of spatial competition is that a slight increase in model complexity 
can generate an intractable increase in mathematical complexity’. This 
is particularly true of any attempt to investigate the interactions bet­
ween price competition and location choices among multiproduct firms. 
As a result, the analysis in this paper is confined to price competition 
under multiproduct duopoly. This implies that product selection in the 
first stage of the game is assumed to be given. Firms do not choose their 
locations but rather are automatically located equidistant from one ano­
ther on the circle2. One can argue that the assumption of exogenously 
given locations is rather restrictive on the grounds that firms generally 
control both price and product selection (location) variables. However, 
for some (differentiated) industries, like air transportation, where the se­
lection of a particular location can be interpreted as the offered departure 
time, it stands to reason that firms do not always control the location or




























































































schedule variable: Once the slots are allocated, they cannot be shifted 
(at least not without cost). This is like having an infinite sunk cost to 
change location. For industries where the schedule -and the frequency 
of service- is the main element of differentiation. I believe that this sim­
plification is not unrealistic, at least in the short run. In the case of 
intra-European airline markets, for example, the choice of the offered de­
parture time greatly depends on local airport authorities which allocate 
available slots (see the related Nero’s [1995a] paper for further details on 
the airline industry). From a modelling point of view, this simplification 
allows us to derive useful results which can subsequently be tested in an 
econometric model.
In summary, the focus of this paper is to study the theoretical im­
plications of different location patterns on pricing, market performance 
and social welfare. In the next two sections I derive the theoretical re­
sults for different location patterns. For the sake of the analysis, I focus 
on two important cases: The two-outlet case (Section 3) and the three- 
outlet case (Section 4). The results are summarised in Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 2. Although the analysis of the two cases is quite similar, I 
derive the results separately in order to provide an interesting compari­
son. The results of this comparison are summarised in Proposition 3.
3 Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing: 
The Two-Outlet Case
Proposition 1 Consider two duopolists, each owning two outlets. Loca­
tions are exogenously given. Two different symmetric location patterns 
are analysed: (1) An interlaced outlet location and (2) a neighbouring 
outlet location. Given the location pattern and the assumptions of Sec­
tion 2, the noncooperative Nash prices are larger in a neighbouring outlet 
equilibrium. As a result, market performance (profit) is larger with neigh­





























































































For the ease of notation let outlet locations and mill prices be given 
by x\ and pk, respectively (with i — 1,2 and k =  A ,B ). Figure 2 (see 
Appendix) depicts the candidate (symmetric) equilibria for the interlaced 
outlet location. Without loss of generality, x\ can be set to zero by choice 
of normalisation. Using (2), the locations of the marginal consumer, z/(-) 
(/ =  1, ..,4 ), are
3.1 The Interlaced Outlet Equilibrium
2 l ( ' )  = I  +  U p b  ~ P a ) , ( 6 )
2 2 ( 0  = I  +  M - p b ) , ( 7 )
2 3 ( 0  = I  +  U p b - P a ) , ( 8 )
24 (*) = I  +  W a - p D - ( 9 )
Given (6)-(9) we derive the market shares Sk(-) for each outlet. Notice 
that under the assumption of unitary (inelastic) demand there is a one 
to one mapping between the market shares and the aggregate demand.
Market shares, Sk(-), are
5 i(- )=  21 + 1-24= \ ~ ^ P a + ^(Pb + P b ), (10)
5 f i ( - )=  2 2 - 2 1 =  \ ~ ^ P b + (̂Pa +Pa), (U )
S\(-)= 23 -  22 =  ^ - ^ P a + j (Pb +Pb), (12)
Sl(-)=  24 23 =  \ ~ ^ P b + \{p\ + p\)- (1 3 )
In this set-up, Firm A ’s and Firm B's profits are
^ ( • )  =  i > ( E ( ^ - ^ ( - ) ) ,  (14)
1=1
and
n/sO  =  ^ (E (p 1B -c B)5U-)), (15)
!=1
respectively, where the subscript ‘7 ’ stands for interlaced locations. The 





























































































^ ^ = 0  i =  1,2 k =  A, B. (16)
dp'k
The solution of the above system yields the following equilibrium prices:
Pa = P a =  A<5 + | (c/3+2c,0, (1")
Pb =  Pb =  <̂5 +  |(ca +  2cb). (18)
The equilibrium prices are an increasing function of the marginal costs. 
Notice that the higher the transportation rate 6, the higher the Nash 
prices. The latter results from the combination of f.o.b. mill pricing and 
totally inelastic demand, so that consumers accept any price. Further­
more, note that when marginal costs are identical, cA — Cb =  c, the 
price-cost margin is equal to 6/16. Plugging the Nash prices (17)-(18) 
into the market boundaries (6)-(9), we can evaluate the market shares 
(10)-( 13):
and
_  1 2(cb -  cA) _  3
8 3<5 ’ 8
_  5 2(cB -  cA) , _  7
8 36 ’ ~4 8
,i, 1 , 4(cb -  cA)
■4 = i +  35 ’ '
_  1 4(cA -  cB) 
’b ~ 4  +  36
~(cA ~  cb) 
36
2(ca -  cb) 
36
=  1.2  
=  1 , 2 .
Finally, after the appropriate substitutions, the profit functions (14)-(15) 
are equal to
n ^ =  ^ [16(^ - c B) - 3<5]2,
n b =  2886^^^C/1 ~  °B  ̂+  ^ 2‘
When marginal costs are equal, we have that I I =  11  ̂ =  T,Dé.
3The existence of equilibrium depends on the quasiconcavity of the profit functions
(14)-(15) and hence on the concavity of the demand functions (10)-(13). Since these 




























































































Figure 3 (see Appendix) depicts the candidate (symmetric) equilibria for 
the neighbouring outlet location. The main difference with the previous 
case is that now each firm has outlets that are no longer isolated from 
each other. In an interlaced equilibrium, the price in each outlet is the 
same as if each were operated by a single firm. Here, the equilibrium is 
likely to be different. Using (2), the locations of the marginal consumer,
3.2 The Neighbouring Outlet Equilibrium
*/(•) (/ =  1, ..,4 ), are
*i(0  =  \ +  W a ~ p\), (19)
**(•) = f + i(P1B -Pl),  (20)
* s ( -)=  | +  UPb ~ P b ) ’ (2 1)
*4 (-)=  1 +  Up \ ~ P b )- (22)
Given (19)-(22) the market shares S'k(-) for each outlet are
S\(-) — Z1 +  I - Z 4 — -  -  -p\ +  - (̂Pa +  Pb )> (23)
S \ (-)=  *2 - * i =  \ - \ p\ +  \(p \ + p 'b), (24)
5 b (-) — 23 — 22=  j  — ~̂ Pb +  + P 2b) i (25)
S2b ( - )=  24- 23=  j  -  -8P2b +~8(p\ + P 1b)- (26)
Firm A ’s and Firm B's profits with two neighbouring outlets are
n ^ (-) =  ^ ( E t ó - ^ ( - ) ) ,  (27)
i=l
and
nJf(-) = i > ( S t ó - c B)si(-)), (28)
i=1
respectively, where the subscript iN r stands for neighbouring locations. 
The noncooperative Nash prices are solutions of the system of first order 
conditions given by:





























































































The solution of the above system yields the following equilibrium prices:
Pa = P a =  |«5 +  |( cs + 2ca ), (30)
Pb = P b =  +  \{ca +  2cfl). (31)
Plugging the Nash prices (30)-(31) into the market boundaries (19)-(22). 
we can evaluate the market shares (23)-(26):
, _  1 » _  3 2(cB - cA)
‘ l “  o ■ zi ~  « +  '8 36
“3 8 ’ ^  8 +
7 2(ca -  cB)
3 6
and
SA = -  +
1 , 2(cB - c A)
3 6
S\
1 , 2(c4 -  cB) 
B 4 +  36
7 =  1.2
i =  1 . 2.
Finally, after the appropriate substitutions, the profit functions (27)-(28) 
are equal to
A 1446
n * ____ —
"  1446
[8(cfl — cA) +  36]2, 
[8(ca — cB) +  36]2.
When marginal costs are equal, then I I =  II ̂  =  j^D6.
3.3 Comparison of the Various Equilibrium Patterns 
in the Two-Outlet Case
3 .3 .1  Equilibrium Price Comparison
Table I (see page 11) summarises the results obtained in Section 3.1 and 
Section 3.2. For the sake of comparison, all values are expressed with a 
common denominator. It appears that the noncooperative Nash prices 




























































































interlaced outlet location yields more competitive Nash prices. This is a 
very intuitive result. Price competition is reduced as the number of Firm 
>Fs outlets which directly compete with Firm B's outlets decreases. Put 
differently, price competition is relaxed when firms own adjacent outlets.
Table I: Equilibrium Price Com parison
Interlaced Equilibrium Neiqhbourmq Equilibrium
Pa =  Pa =  Uti6 +  +  2cu) P1A= P 2A* =  m 6 +  UcB + 2cA)
Pb =  Pb =  M i 6 +  f (Gi +  2 °b ) P1b = P 2b= &  +  1 (ca +  2cb )
3 .3 .2  Consum er Loss and W elfare
In this section I compare the two location patterns in terms of market 
performance (Ilf B, E =  I ,N) ,  consumer loss (CLE) (f.o.b. mill price 
plus transport costs given the inelastic demand) and welfare loss (W L E) 
(transport costs, i.e., disutility). For the sake of simplicity, let us assume 
that marginal costs are identical, i.e., cA — cB — c. Without loss of 
generality, let the marginal costs be zero.
Interlaced Outlet Location
Since all consumers pay the same f.o.b. mill price, total revenue 
is j]r. Given the locations of the marginal consumers z* (l =  1 ,.., 4) (see 
Section 3.1), transportation costs, T1, are given by
/*S =  1 /8  x
T 7 =  Z ) ( 8 ^ o \6s2]ds).
Explicit evaluation of (32) yields so that
CL1 =  - ( D 6
16
D<5 13D5































































































Now all consumers pay the same f.o.b. mill price, |, and total 
revenue is Given the locations of the marginal consumers z* (l =  
1 , 4 )  (see Section 3.2), transportation costs, TN. are
, . rs=1/8 .
TN =  D { % j ^  [ós2]ds). (34)
Notice that (34) is equal to (32), so that the transportation costs paid 
by consumers amount to Finally,
CLS
D 6 D 6 25D6
( 8 +  192  ̂ 192 '
(35)
Table II (see page 12) summarises these results. For the sake of compa­
rison, all values are expressed with a common denominator. Notice that 
when marginal costs are identical, each firm covers 50% of the market 
and industry profits are twice the profit of a single firm. The results of 
Table I and Table II provide a proof of Proposition 1.





Industry Profit 47628 D 6  762048 1~/u 95256 D 6762048 J~y u
Consumer Surplus (CL) 51597 D 6762048 99225 D 6762048
Welfare Loss (WL) 3969 r-)c 762048
3969 r)C  
762048 U 0





























































































4 Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing: 
The Three-Outlet Case
Proposition 2 Consider two duopolists, each owning three outlets. Lo­
cations are exogenously given. Three different symmetric location pat­
terns are analysed: (1) An interlaced outlet location, (2) a neighbouring 
outlet location, and (3) a mixed outlet location pattern. Given the loca­
tion pattern and the assumptions of Section 2, the noncooperative Nash 
prices are larger in a neighbouring outlet equilibrium, ceteris paribus. 
The interlaced outlet equilibrium yields the more competitive Nash pri­
ces. Nash prices with the mixed outlet equilibrium are lower than with a 
neighbouring location but higher than with an interlaced location. Profits 
follow the same pattern, i.e., the highest profits are obtained under the 
neighbouring location whereas the lowest profits are obtained under the 
interlaced location. Finally, social welfare is higher under the interlaced 
location. Neighbouring location is the less socially desirable pattern.
4.1 The Interlaced Outlet Equilibrium
Let outlet locations and mill prices be given by x\ and p\, respectively 
with i =  1 ,2 ,3  and k =  A,B.  Figure 4 (see Appendix) depicts the 
candidate (symmetric) equilibria for the interlaced outlet location. Using 
(2), the locations of the marginal consumer, £;(•) (l =  1, ..,6 ), are
Zl(-) = T2 +  Up b - P a ), (36)
z1{-) = £  +  § ( P l - A h (37)
Zs(-) = % +  I(p 2b- p2a), (38)
**(•) = h  +  \(jp\~P2s\ (39)





























































































Given (36)-(41) we derive the market shares S'k(-) for each outlet. Market
shares, S'k(-), are
S\(-) = 2l +  1 — 6̂ —
1 6 j 3 1 ,
s - - t r .  +  -s (p .+ P s ) , (42)
5 i( - )  = Z2 -  Zl = ç - - 6p ,  +  -6(p . + pa). (43)
S\(-) = 23 — 22 =
1 6 2 3 J 2 
6 - ( P t  +  p B + P . ) , (44)
s l ( - )  = 24 — 23 = 1 -  ( pb +  (̂P (45)
II<0 25 ~  24 = 1 6 3  3 2 3 ,g ~  ~çPa +  {Pb + P b )> (46)
s|(-) = 26 — 25 =
1 6 3  3 j 3 
6 ~ 8Pb +  ~^Pa + Pa )- (47)
Firm .4’s and Firm B's profits can be expressed as
n i O  =  £ ( X > Â - C A ) ^ ( - ) ) ,  (48)
*'=1
and
n  IB (-) =  D ( Y /(piB - c B)SiB(-)), (49)
i=l
respectively, where the subscript T  stands for interlaced locations. The 
noncooperative Nash prices are solutions of the system of first order 
conditions
f =  1,2,3 k =  A,B.  (50)
dpi
and equal to
Pa =  Pa =  Pa =  à 6 +  K cb +  2c*), (51)
Pb —P2b = P!b — 36̂  +  |(ca + 2cb). (52)
Equilibrium prices are again an increasing function of both the marginal 
costs and the transportation rate 8. Notice that when marginal costs 
are identical, Ca =  Cb =  c, the price-cost margin is 8/36. This is the 




























































































firm. Plugging the Nash prices (51 )-(52) into the market boundaries (36)- 
(41), we can evaluate the market shares (42)-(47):
, 1 , cB -  cA ,  _ 3 cA - c B * _  5 cB - c A
h ~ \ 2  8 ,Z2~ 1 2  8 ,23 12 8
* _ l CA CB * _  ̂ Cft Ĉ4 * _ W Ca CB
Za =  Y2 +  6 , 2 5 _ 12 6 ' Ze~ l 2 8
and
ni* 1 , 2(°b ~ cA) 
b A ~ 6 + 8
ni* 1 , 2 (CA - C B)
b B ~ 6 + 8
i =  1 ,2 ,3  
i =  1 ,2 ,3 .
Finally, the profit functions (48)-(49) are equal to 
=  ^ [ i 2(cs -  °a ) +  8\2, 
K  =  ^ r M c B - c A) - 8]\
When marginal costs are equal, we have II7, =  IIg — j^D8.
4.2 The Neighbouring Outlet Equilibrium
Figure 5 (see Appendix) depicts the candidate (symmetric) equilibria for 
the neighbouring outlet location. From Figure 5 it appears that the outlet 
located at x2A(x2B) is fully isolated from Firm B's (Firm A ’s) outlets. 
Using (2), the locations of the marginal consumer, 2;(-) (l — 1, . . ,6), axe
z l ( - )  = ^  +  I(P2A -P \), (53)
z2 ( ')  = % +  I(Pa ~P2a), (54)
zs (0  = ^  +  I(p1b- P 3a), (55)
Z4 ( ')  = £  +  !  [p2b - P Xb\ (56)

































































































Given (53)-(58), the market shares S'k(-) for each outlet are 
S \ (')=  2i +  1 - 2 6 =  ^ +  ^(Pa + P b ), (59)
s 2 A-)  = IIiT1cs
N 1 6 2 3 , 3
6 ~ 6Pa +  s {'Pa + P a ^ (60)
5 j( - )  = 23 — 22 —
1 6 3 3 . , 2 . 
6 ~ 6P a +  Ŝ P b + P a ^ (61)
SH-) = M 1 CO II
1 6 , 3 . 2 3 .
6 ~  sPb + 6^ b + P a ^
(62)
s l ( - )  = Z5 ~ Z4 —
1 6 2 3 .1  3 .
-6- - 6Pb +  -( (Pb + P b )- (63)
s l ( - )  = z6 ~ zb = jj>b + j l r i + p l ) - (64)
As before, Firm A and Firm B ’s problem reduces to maximising





respectively, where the subscript ‘N ’ stands for neighbouring locations. 
The noncooperative Nash prices are solutions of the system
8n/ <  » = „  
dpi
.,2 ,3 k =  A, B. (67)
and equal to
Pa =  P3a* =
6 c 1 ,
72^ +  g (cB +  2 ca), Pa = 7 ^  +
~(cB +  2ca), (68)
and
Pb =  Pb =
6 c 1 /— 6 +  ~(cA +  2cb ), 
il O Pb => - ( ca +  2cb ). (69)
Notice that p > Pa =  Pa , and Pb > Pb -  n3*— Pb ■ Firm A ’s (Firm B's)
market power is higher at location x2 A{x2B) since, at that location, there is 




























































































at Zi and z2 (24 and 25). Plugging the Nash prices (68)-(69) into the 
market boundaries (53)-(58). we obtain
* 3 5 . 106 +  24(cB - -  CA )
24 ’ 22 ~ 24 ’ *3 — 246
. * 15 17 226 -  24(cA --  cB)
*4 — 24’ *5 ~  24'» ~6 — 2 4 6
Ql* II to
56 +  2 4 ( cb  -  
2 4 6




5 6  +  2 4 (cA -  




”  1 2 '
The profit functions are
n " -  ^ [2 8 8 (cB -  ca )(2cb -  2ca + 6) + 3762],
K  =  ^ [ 2 8 8 ( c B -  ca )(2cb ~ 2ca -  6) +  3762].
With equal marginal costs, 11^ =  IIB =  ^ D6.
4.3 The Mixed Outlet Equilibrium
In this section, I investigate how the equilibrium prices are affected under 
the mixed outlet equilibrium. Let us focus on the mixed outlet equili­
brium represented in Figure 6 (see Appendix). Each firm now owns two 
adjacent outlets and one interlaced outlet. The mixed outlet equilibrium 
is likely to be a combination of the previous two cases. The locations of 
the marginal consumer, £/(•) (l =  1 , 6), are
*i(0 = è  + f t ò - r i ) , (70)
z*{-) = è  + f t à - P Ì ) . (71)
*3(0 - Y-2+Up Ì - P b I (72)
ZA{-) = é  + f ( P A - P Ì h (73)
Zs(-) = è + l  ( P Ì - P Ì ) , (74)




























































































while the market shares, S).(-), are
S\(-) =
, 1 6 ! 3 2 3 ,
Z1 +  1 -  z6 — g “  -j-PA +  ~$(Pa +P fi). (76)
S\(-) = 1 6 2 3 , 1  hz2 -  zi — g -  -̂ Pa +  g(Pa + P b )i (77)
S\(-) =
1 6  3 3 , 2 3 .
zh ~ zi — g -  fiPA +  j ÌPb +  Pb )’ (78)
5 i( - )  =
1 6 J 3 2 2 
z3 -  z2 — -  — - P̂b +  -j.{pA + P b )i (79)
s l ( - )  =
1 6 2 3 1 3 . 
z* -  ; 3 — g -  ^Pb +  ^(Pb + P a )' (80)
Sl(-) =
1 6 3 3 , 3 
z6 ~ z5 — g — - P̂b +  ~ij(PA+Pa )- (81)
Firm A and Firm B's problem is to maximise




n%(-) =  D ( E ( p iB - c B) s iB(-j), (83)
i=l
respectively, where the subscript ‘M ’ stands for mixed locations. The 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium prices are solutions of the system of 6 
first order conditions
=  0 i =  1 ,2 ,3  k =  A,B.
dpi
and equal to
i. 18 r 1 , „ .
Pa _  3786 + 3 (Cb +  2C/i)’
Pa = ^  + 1{CB + 2Ca)'
3,  13 1
Pa "  37 86 +  3 ( cb +  2Ca)’
and
i. 19 1

































































































(89)2» 18 C 1 / „  .
Pb ~ 3 7 8 6 +  3 {ca +  2cb)'
Pb =  +  g (c/i +  2cb). (90)
In contrast with the previous cases, the f.o.b. mill price is different at each 
location x \ B (i =  1 ,2 ,3 ). Indeed, p24* >  p̂ * >  p^*, and pB > p2B > pB . 
It is interesting to observe that locations x\ and xB face a lower mill 
price. At these locations Firm B's (Firm A) outlets surround the outlet 
located at x\(xzB). As a result, the rivalry to compete for the marginal 
consumers located at 24,25 and 26 is more important, ceteris paribus. 
Plugging the Nash prices (85)-(90) into the market boundaries (70)-(75), 
we obtain
23 , 636 +  252(cB — cA) , 103 , 1376 +  252(cA -  cB)
~  252'~2 ~ 2526 ,Zz~  252,Z4~  2526
, 1896 +  252(cb -  cA) , 2416 -  252{cA - c B)
Zf> ~  2526 ’ ~  2526
and
qu _  346 +  252(cg - cA) 2» _  406 +  252(cB — cA) 
A ~  2526 ’ A ~  2526
3, _  526 +  252(2cB -  2cA) u _  406 +  252(<u -  cB) 
A 2526 ’ B 2526
ea. _  346 + 252(ca - cb) 3, _  526 +  252(2cA -  2cB)
B 2526 ’ B 2526
Finally,
Ua =  1 1 ^ 7 6 [3%9(Cx "  Cb )(4Ca ~  4cb ~ 6) +  25652j’ 
n B =  Y Y ^ [ 3969( ^  ~  cb)(4ca -  4cB +  6) +  2566s].
It is straightforward to note that when marginal costs tire equal, Il^f =
r i M  _  256 t-) c




























































































4.4 Comparison of the Various Equilibrium Patterns 
in the Three-Outlet Case
4 .4 .1  Equilibrium Price Comparison
Table III summarises the results obtained in Section 4.1, Section 4.2 and 
Section 4.3.
Table III: Equilibrium Price Com parison
Interlaced Location Mixed Location N eiqhbounnq Location
„ ! *  84 c , (cb + 2 ca ) 
B A —  3024 ~  3
„2 *  84 c , (cb + 2 ca ) 
B  A —  3024U “  3
3* _  84 c | {cB + 2 c A) 
—  3024 ' 3
n l«  144 c | (cB + 2 c4 ) 
B A  ~~ 3024u ' 3
2* _  152 c , (cB + 2 c4 ) 
B  A —  3024 ' 3
3* _  104 c - (cb + 2 ca ) 
r A  3024 ' 3
..1» 252 c , (c b+ 2 c4 ) 
Pa —  3024 0  3
2* _  294 c , {cb + 2 ca!  
Pa -  3024 0 +  3
„ 3 .  _  252 x . (cB+ 2 c A ) 
B A  ~  3024 ' 3
n l* 84 c | (ca + 2 cb ) 
P B  3024U ^  3
n2* _  84 c , [?a + 2 cb1  
P B  3024° ^  3
„3 *  _  84 c | (ca + 2 cb ) 
P B  3024° ^  3
_  152 c , (ca+ 2 cb ) 
P B  -  3024° +  3
r.2* _  144 c , (cA+ 2 cB ) 
P B  —  3024° 3
~3* _  104 c | («ca + 2 cb ) 
P B  ~  3024° +  3
1» _  252 c , (ca + 2 cb ) 
BB  3024U ' 3
~2* _  294 c , (ca + 2 cb ) 
P B  ~  3024 0 3
3* _  252 c , (cA+ 2 cB ) 
P B  ~  3024° +  3
The noncooperative Nash prices are larger in a neighbouring outlet 
equilibrium. The interlaced outlet equilibrium yields the more competi­
tive Nash prices. Nash prices with the mixed outlet equilibrium are lower 
than with a neighbouring location but higher than with an interlaced lo­
cation. Consequently, prices are increasing as the number of Firm A ’s 
(Firm B's) neighbouring outlets increases. This is an appealing result. 
Price competition is reduced as the number of Firm A ’s outlets which 
directly compete with Firm B's outlets decreases. Put differently, as the 
number of neighbouring outlets increases, each firm coordinates its pri­
cing policy in order to avoid ‘cannibalization’ between its own outlets. As 





























































































4 .4 .2  Consum er Loss and W elfare
In this section. I compare the three location patterns in terms of market 
performance (I lf  B, E  =  I ,N ,M ) ,  consumer loss (CLE) and welfare loss 
(W LE). Again, assume that cA — Cb =  c =  0.
Interlaced Outlet Location
Since all consumers pay the same f.o.b. mill price, ^ , total revenue 
(price paid by all consumers) is Given the locations of the marginal 
consumers z* (l =  1 , . . ,6) (see Section 4.1), transportation costs, T1, are 
given by
T /  =  Z ? ( l2 y _ () [6s2]ds). (91)
Evaluating expression (91) yields Consequently,
CL'  = ~ ^  +
D 6 13D6
432 — ( 432 '
(92)
Neighbouring Outlet Location
In this case things are a bit more complicated since not all consu­
mers pay the same f.o.b. mill price (see Section 4.2). Indeed, in equili­
brium, || =  83.3% of consumers pay a f.o.b. mill price equal to 66/72, 
while ^  =  16.6% of consumers pay a price equal to 76/72. The latter 
price is paid by the consumers located at proximity of x2A and x2B. It is 
straightforward to show that total revenue amounts to Given the
locations of the marginal consumers z* (l =  1 , . . ,6), transportation costs, 
T A , are given by
„ , rs=1/24 r « = z /24 m = 3 /2 4  ,
T n = d (4 /  [6s2]ds +  4 /  [6s2}ds +  4 /  [6s2}ds). (93)
Js=0 Js=0 J s=0 '
/•»=2/ s = 3/24
Explicit evaluation of (93) yields |||, so that
C L "  =  - (
37 DS DS 






























































































In equilibrium, consumers pay three different f.o.b. mill prices (see 
Section 4.3). It can be shown that, ^  =  27.0% of consumers pay a price 
equal to 186/378, ^  =  31.7% pay a price equal to 196/378, and finally 
HI =  41.3% of consumers pay a price equal to 136/378. The latter, more 
competitive price is paid by the consumers located at proximity of x\ 
and x%. Hence, total revenue amounts to Given the locations of
the marginal consumers z* (Z =  1, . . ,6), transportation costs, TM, are
Tm =  D ( 2 f  2”  [6s2]ds+2 f  “ 2 [6s2}ds+i f  # [6s2]ds+2 f  “  [6s2}ds). 
' J s=0 J s=0 J s=0 J s=0
(95)
Explicit evaluation of (95) yields It follows that
M 512D6 545D6 8737Z96
_  11907 +  190512} ~  190512
(96)
Table IV summarises these results. Notice that when marginal costs 
are identical, each firm covers 50% of the market and industry profits 
are twice the profit of a single firm. Neighbouring locations give rise to 
significantly higher profits. Social welfare (or average transport costs) is 
higher under the interlaced location. The results of Table IV suggest that 
neighbouring location is the less socially desirable pattern. Notice that all 
results were obtained with outlets assumed to be equispaced. Therefore, 
in equilibrium, different transportation costs (or welfare) arise because 
different mill prices are charged by duopolists. The results of Table III 
and Table IV (see page 23) provide a proof of Proposition 2.
In summary, the results of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 show 
that both prices and market performance are higher under a neighbouring 
location pattern. It is important to note that the interlaced location and 
neighbouring location constitute the two benchmark cases. When the 
number of outlets is larger than two, the mixed location equilibrium 
yields intermediate results4. I would like to stress that the results of 
Proposition 1 and of Proposition 2 are likely to hold under alternative





































































































Consumer Loss (CL) 
Welfare Loss (WL)
21168 D 6762048




34948 D 6762048 J~/u
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67914 D 6762048 'Lyu
2646 D 6762048
assumptions, in particular, with an elastic (downward sloping) demand 
and/or a two stage location-then-price equilibrium with more than two 
firms. However, it still remains to study the sensitivity of this result to 
a non uniform demand distribution.
Finally, a last result is derived from the comparison between the two- 
outlet case (Section 3) and the three-outlet case (Section 4).
Proposition 3 Given the results of Proposition 1 (Section 3) and Pro­
position 2 (Section f) , we have that both noncooperative Nash prices and 
profits are higher in the two-outlet case, ceteris paribus. Social welfare, 
however, is higher in the three-outlet case.
The proof of Proposition 3 directly follows from the comparison 
of Tables (I)-(II) and Tables (III)-(IV). Given the inelastic demand as­
sumption, it is not surprising that prices and profits are higher in the 
two-outlet case. This arises because two contrasting effects are at work 
when a third outlet is introduced. The introduction of the third outlet 
has a positive market share effect (through a better market segmenta­
tion) but a negative price effect due to the increase in price competition. 
Here, we show that the negative price effect dominates the positive mar­
ket share effect. This latter result is similar to Martinez-Giralt & Neven 
[1988]. Interestingly, notice that duopolists would prefer to provide three 




























































































interlaced pattern. Finally, observe that with quadratic utility loss, so­
cial welfare is higher in the three-outlet case. This occurs because the 
introduction of a third outlet allows consumers to incur lower average 
transportation costs.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the theoretical implications of location patterns in a 
spatial multiproduct duopoly model. In particular, it addresses the follo­
wing question: To what extent do location patterns affect firms’ pricing 
behaviour and market performance? I show that equilibrium prices are 
higher under a neighbouring location pattern. In other words, noncoope­
rative Nash prices axe higher when the organisational market structure 
is such that firms own strategically dependent outlets. In contrast, I de­
monstrate that an interlaced location pattern yields the most competitive 
(Nash) prices. Finally, I also show that social welfare is higher under an 
interlaced location pattern. These results appear to be robust within the 
standard assumptions of the spatial model. For example, Bensaid & de 
Palma [1994] obtain similar results using a two stage location-then-price 
game. However, it still remains to check the sensitivity of these results 
to a non uniform demand distribution.
The analysis of a spatial multiproduct (duopoly) model has many 
potential applications in Industrial Organisation. In a product differen­
tiation interpretation, a neighbouring location pattern arises when each 
firm specialises on a segment of the ‘product line’. In a nonspatial con­
text, a neighbouring location pattern arises when, for example, in a given 
duopoly market an airline provides all the morning flights and its rival 
provides all the afternoon flights. In a related paper (Nero [1995a]), an 
empirical model is derived from the present theoretical model. In particu­
lar, the empirical model explicitly controls for the location pattern effect 
using data on intra-European duopoly airline markets. The principal em­
pirical result suggests that the neighbouring location pattern hypothesis 
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Figure 2: Interlaced Locations with two Outlets




























































































Figure 4: Interlaced Locations in the Three Outlet Case
Figure 5: Neighbouring Locations with three Outlets
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